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Abstract. In this document we present an introductory overview of the algo-
rithms and design components underlying the Keccac cryptographic primitive 
and the Keyak encryption scheme for authenticated (session-supporting) en-
cryption. This document aims to familiarize readers with the basic principles of 
authenticated encryption, the Sponge and Duplex constructions (full-state, 
keyed as well as regular versions), the permutation functions underlying Keccak 
and Keyak as well as Keyak v2’s Motorist mode of operation. 
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1 Introduction 
This document presents an overview of the algorithms and design components under-
lying the Keccac [18] cryptographic primitive (a subset of which has been standard-
ized by NIST as the SHA-3 cryptographic hash function [19]) and the Keyak v2 [24] 
(hereafter referred to simply as Keyak) encryption scheme for authenticated (session-
supporting) encryption. 
 
The goal of this document is to provide readers with an overview of the goals and 
need for Authenticated Encryption, especially within the context of the CAESAR 
competition [16], and the permutations and constructions underlying the Keccak and 
Keyak families. This document does not seek to compile a state-of-the-art overview of 
either permutation-based encryption or Sponge (and related) constructions nor does it 
present original research or seek to improve upon the current state-of-the-art. Nor is 
this document intended to be an implementation reference and as such implementers 
are referred to the original specification documents for Keccak [18] and Keyak [24]. 
 
Instead it seeks to gather and present available documentation on these matters in a 
single, accessible introductory document (omitting design considerations and justifi-
cations, security proofs and formalizations for the sake of brevity and clarity) aimed 
at students and industry professionals. 
 
  
2 Authenticated Encryption 
Authenticated Encryption (AE) or Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data 
(AEAD) is a cryptographic mode of operation [1] providing confidentiality, integrity 
and authenticity assurances on data where decryption is combined in single step with 
integrity validation. Data authentication is of importance in scenarios where a Man-
in-the-Middle (MitM) attacker can make arbitrary modifications to the senders’ ci-
phertext before it is received by the recipient. This can lead to a whole host of prob-
lems ranging from (in the simplest case) data corruption to bit-flipping attacks [2] and 
padding oracle attacks [3]. Cryptographic schemes which only guarantee confidential-
ity are at risk of such attacks [4]. 
 
There are two categories of modes of operation providing confidentiality and authen-
ticity: AE and AEAD. The difference between the two is that the latter allows for the 
authentication of data separate from the plaintext (known as Additional Authenticated 
Data (AAD)) which does not require confidentiality and is only authenticated and not 
encrypted. This serves to prevent modifications to metadata (eg. ip address and port in 
network data or e-mail headers in email data) by a MitM attacker. In this document 
when we refer to AE we refer to both categories unless explicitly stated otherwise. 
 
The need for AE arose out of observations that combining block cipher confidentiality 
modes with block cipher authentication modes proved easy to get wrong in practice 
[5]. Combining secure ciphers with secure MACs could still result in insecure authen-
ticated encryption schemes as shown by practical attacks against eg. SSL/TLS [6,7]. 
 
An example AE mode API would look as follows: 
 
(𝑐, 𝑎) =  Encrypt(𝑝, 𝑘, optional ℎ) 
𝑝′ =  Decrypt(𝑐, 𝑘, 𝑎, optional ℎ) 
 
For ciphertext 𝑐, authentication tag 𝑎, plaintext 𝑝, secret key 𝑘, optional header ℎ and 
decrypted ciphertext 𝑝′. 
 
The optional header is the Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) discussed above. 
The authentication tag consists of a Message Authentication Code (MAC). Decryp-
tion outputs either the plaintext or an error if the provided authentication tag does not 
match the provided ciphertext or optional header. 
 
AE comes in the form of either specialized block cipher modes of operation (eg. 
OCB, EAX, CCM, GCM, etc.) [8] or a general construction (not limited to block 
ciphers) combining an encryption scheme and a MAC provided that the encryption 
scheme is secure under a Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA) and the MAC is unforgeable 
under a Chosen Message Attack (CMA). Three widespread compositions of these 
primitives are listed by Krawczyk [9] as follows: 
 
  
 Encrypt-then-Authenticate (EtA): Here the plaintext is first encrypted after 
which a MAC of the ciphertext is generated as the authentication tag. The 
result is the pair (𝑐𝑖𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡, 𝑡𝑎𝑔 = 𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝑐𝑖𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡). 
 
 
Fig. 1: Encrypt-then-Authenticate [10] 
 
 Encrypt-and-Authenticate (AaM): Here a MAC of the plaintext is produced 
and the plaintext is encrypted separately resulting in the pair 
(𝑐𝑖𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡, 𝑡𝑎𝑔 = 𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡)). 
 
 
Fig. 2: Encrypt-and-Authenticate [10] 
 
 Authenticate-then-Encrypt (AtE): Here a MAC of the plaintext is generated 
and concatenated with the plaintext with the result being encrypted resulting 
in (𝑐𝑖𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 𝐸(𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡|𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡), 𝐾). 
 
  
 
Fig. 3: Authenticate-then-Encrypt [10] 
 
Note that in the above figures 1 to 3 the same key is used for encryption and authenti-
cation while it is recommended [11] to use two different secret keys for these differ-
ent purposes. 
 
The Encrypt-then-Authenticate approach has been shown [9] to be secure (provided 
the underlying primitives meet the appropriate security requirements). While Encrypt-
and-Authenticate and Authenticate-then-Encrypt have not been shown to be secure by 
themselves some implementations have been shown to be secure. On the other hand 
while Krawczyk initially reported the AtE scheme used in SSL/TLS to be secure he 
revised his results [12] and it was found that using SSL/TLS with a block cipher in 
CBC mode was insecure due to the way in which the plaintext was encoded and pad-
ded [13]. 
 
Given these implementation troubles NIST specified [14,15] two block cipher modes 
of operation (namely CCM and GCM) offering AE functionality (or rather, AEAD 
functionality to be more precise). It is important to note that when using randomized 
IVs appended to the ciphertext one should authenticate the (𝐼𝑉, 𝑐𝑖𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡) pair. 
2.1 CAESAR 
CAESAR [16] (Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, 
and Robustness) is a project to “identify a portfolio of authenticated ciphers that (1) 
offer advantages over AES-GCM and (2) are suitable for widespread adoption”. 
 
CAESAR submissions specify a family of (one or more) authenticated ciphers the 
members of which may vary in external parameters.  
 
 
 
  
CAESAR submissions follow an API specification consisting of: 
 
𝑐 =  Encrypt(𝑝, 𝑘, optional 𝑑, optional 𝑚𝑛𝑠, optional 𝑚𝑛𝑝) 
 
For ciphertext 𝑐, plaintext 𝑝, secret key 𝑘, optional associated data 𝑑, optional secret 
message number 𝑚𝑛𝑠 and optional public message number 𝑚𝑛𝑝. 
 
See figure 4 for the different security purposes and restrictions of the inputs. 
 
 Integrity Confidentiality Length Optional May impose 
single-use 
requirements 
Plaintext Yes Yes Variable No No 
Associated 
Data 
Yes No Variable Yes No 
Secret 
Message 
Number 
Yes Yes Fixed Yes Yes 
Public 
Message 
Number 
Yes No Fixed Yes Yes 
Key N/A N/A Fixed No N/A 
Fig. 4: Security purposes and restrictions of inputs [17] 
 
CAESAR submission ciphers are expected to maintain security regardless of the us-
er’s choice of message numbers with the exception of reuse of a single 
(𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟, 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟) pair for two encryptions with 
the same key. 
3 Keccak 
Keccak [18] is a family of sponge functions (see section 3.1) a subset of which has 
been standardized by NIST as the SHA-3 cryptographic hash function [19]. Keccak 
uses one of seven permutations denoted as  𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘𝑓[𝑏] (where permutation width 
b ∈ {25,50,100,200,400,800,1600}) as primitive in the sponge construction, with 
𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘𝑓[1600] being the permutation of choice for SHA-3. 
Each of these permutations consists of the iterative application of a simple round 
function (similar to block ciphers but without key scheduling) with operations limited 
to bitwise XOR, AND, NOT and rotations. 
The description in this section draws upon those outlined in [18,22,23]. 
  
3.1 The Sponge Construction 
A sponge construction or sponge function [20] is a type of algorithm with a finite 
internal state consuming an arbitrary-length input bitstream and producing an output 
bitstream of an arbitrary desired length. Sponge functions can serve to implement 
various cryptographic primitives such as cryptographic hash functions, MACs, stream 
ciphers, PRNGs and AE schemes due to its arbitrarily long input and output sizes. 
Sponge constructions are iterated constructions operating on an internal state 𝑆  of 
width 𝑏 bits (where 𝑏 = (𝑟 + 𝑐) with 𝑟 denoting the bitrate and 𝑐 denoting the capac-
ity) by applying the fixed-length permutation function 𝑓 to it as illustrated in figure 5. 
 
Fig. 5: Sponge construction [20] 
The sponge function starts by padding the input string to a length that is a multiple of 
𝑟 using a reversible padding rule before cutting it into 𝑛 blocks of 𝑟 bits. Next 𝑏 bits 
of state 𝑆 are initialized to zero and the sponge construction proceeds in two phases: 
 Absorbing: In the absorbing phase every 𝑟-bit input block is XORed into the 
first 𝑟 bits of the state 𝑆 followed by application of the permutation function 
𝑓 to 𝑆 resulting in a new state 𝑆′. After all input blocks have been processed 
in this fashion (ie. the padded input has been fully absorbed) the sponge con-
struction switches to the squeezing phase.  
 
 Squeezing: In the squeezing phase the user chooses the number of 𝑟-bit sized 
output blocks. For every block the first 𝑟 bits of the state 𝑆 are returned fol-
lowed by application of the permutation function 𝑓 to 𝑆. 
  
Note that the last 𝑐 bits (the capacity) of the state are never directly affected by the 
input blocks during the absorbing phase and are never output during the squeezing 
phase. 
An example sponge construction API would look as follows: 
𝑍 = 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑒[𝑓, 𝑝𝑎𝑑, 𝑟](𝑀, 𝑙) 
For input message 𝑀 and requested output length 𝑙. 
3.2 The 𝑲𝒆𝒄𝒄𝒂𝒌𝒇 permutation function 
There are 7 𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘𝑓 [18] permutation functions denoted as 𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘𝑓[𝑏] where 𝑏 =
25 ∗ 2𝑙 and 0 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 6, 𝑙 ∈ ℤ. One of the advantages of a permutation over traditional 
usage of block ciphers is that there is no need for a key schedule nor for an inverse. 
The 𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘𝑓  function operates over an internal state 𝑆 which is represented as an 
array of 5x5 lanes each of length 𝑤 = 2𝑙. The state can be divided in various parts 
(depending on axis or axes along which we select our bits) each with their own name 
as shown in figures 6a-c where the 𝑥 and 𝑦 axes represent a selection among the 5x5 
lanes and the 𝑧 axis a 𝑤-bit sized lane. 
 
 
Fig. 6a: 𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘𝑓 full state [21] 
  
 
Fig. 6b: 𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘𝑓 state row, column and lane [21] 
 
Fig. 6c: 𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘𝑓 state plane, slice and sheet [21] 
The 𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘𝑓[𝑏] function consists of the iterated application of a round function with 
the permutation-width dependent number of rounds 𝑛𝑟 given by 𝑛𝑟 = 12 + 2𝑙 where 
𝑤 = 2𝑙 as illustrated in figure 7. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7: 𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘𝑓 permutation pseudo-code [22] 
Keccak-f[b](S): 
  for 𝑖 ∈ {0, . . , (𝑛𝑟 − 1)}: 
    S = Round[b](S, 𝑅𝐶𝑖) 
  Return S 
  
The Keccak round function, as illustrated in figure 8, consists of the application of 
five steps 𝜃, 𝜌, 𝜋, 𝜒, 𝜄 to the state 𝑆 and a round constant 𝑅𝐶𝑖  (where 𝑖 is the current 
round index) as defined in the round constant table in figure 9. 
Fig. 8: Round pseudo-code [22] 
In figure 8 𝐴 denotes the complete permutation state array (with 𝐴[𝑥, 𝑦] denoting a 
particular lane) whereas 𝐵[𝑥, 𝑦], 𝐶[𝑥] and 𝐷[𝑥] are intermediate variables. The con-
stants 𝑟[𝑥, 𝑦] are rotation offsets as listed in the table in figure 10. The 𝑟𝑜𝑡 operation 
is a bitwise cyclic right-ward shift operation moving a bit at position 𝑖 to position 
(𝑖 + 𝑟) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑤. 
  
Round[b](A, RC): 
  //𝜃-step for bit diffusion 
  for 𝑥 ∈ {0, . . ,4}: 
    C[x] = A[x,0] xor A[x,1] xor A[x,2] xor A[x,3] xor A[x,4] 
 
  for 𝑥 ∈ {0, . . ,4}: 
    D[x] = C[x-1] xor rot(C[x+1], 1) 
 
  for (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ {{0, . . ,4}𝑥{0, . . ,4}}: 
    A[x,y] = A[x,y] xor D[x] 
 
  //𝜌-step for inter-slice diffusion and 
  //𝜋-step for disturbing x,y alignment through lane-transposition 
  for (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ {{0, . . ,4}𝑥{0, . . ,4}}: 
    B[y, 2x + 3y] = rot(A[x,y], r[x,y]) 
 
  //𝜒-step for non-linear mapping 
  for (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ {{0, . . ,4}𝑥{0, . . ,4}}: 
    A[x,y] = B[x,y] xor ((not B[x+1,y]) and B[x+2,y]) 
 
  //𝜄-step to break symmetry 
  A[0,0] = A[0,0] xor RC 
 
  Return A 
 
  
RC[ 0] 0x0000000000000001 RC[12] 0x000000008000808B 
RC[ 1] 0x0000000000008082 RC[13] 0x800000000000008B 
RC[ 2] 0x800000000000808A RC[14] 0x8000000000008089 
RC[ 3] 0x8000000080008000 RC[15] 0x8000000000008003 
RC[ 4] 0x000000000000808B RC[16] 0x8000000000008002 
RC[ 5] 0x0000000080000001 RC[17] 0x8000000000000080 
RC[ 6] 0x8000000080008081 RC[18] 0x000000000000800A 
RC[ 7] 0x8000000000008009 RC[19] 0x800000008000000A 
RC[ 8] 0x000000000000008A RC[20] 0x8000000080008081 
RC[ 9] 0x0000000000000088 RC[21] 0x8000000000008080 
RC[10] 0x0000000080008009 RC[22] 0x0000000080000001 
RC[11] 0x000000008000000A RC[23] 0x8000000080008008 
Fig. 9: Round Constant table [22] 
Round Constants are given by 𝑅𝐶[𝑖][0,0,2𝑗 − 1] = 𝑟𝑐[𝑗 + 7𝑖] for 0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑙 where 𝑖 
is the round index and all other 𝑅𝐶[𝑖][𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧] are zero. The values 𝑟𝑐[𝑡] ∈ GF(2) are 
given by the LFSR 𝑟𝑐[𝑡] = (𝑥𝑡  mod 𝑥8 + 𝑥6 + 𝑥5 + 𝑥4 + 1) mod 𝑥 in GF(2)[𝑥] 
with period 255. 
 x=3 x=4 x=0 x=1 x=2 
y=2 25 39 3 10 43 
y=1 55 20 36 44 6 
y=0 28 27 0 1 62 
y=4 56 14 18 2 61 
y=3 21 8 41 45 15 
Fig. 10: Rotation Offset table [22] 
 
  
3.3 Keccak’s pad10*1 Padding 
The (reversible) padding rule used in Keccak [18] pads a message 𝑀 to a sequence of 
𝑥-bit blocks and is denoted by 𝑀||𝑝𝑎𝑑[𝑥](|𝑀|). Keccak’s multi-rate padding, denot-
ed by pad10*1, appends a single bit 1 followed by the minimum number of bits 0 
followed by a single bit 1 such that the length of the result is a multiple of the block-
length. 
3.4 The Keccak Sponge Function 
When combining the above documented functions into a sponge construction we ob-
tain the 𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘[𝑟, 𝑐] sponge function (where 𝑟 denotes bitrate and 𝑐 denotes capaci-
ty)  as illustrated in figure 11. Note that the pseudo-code in figure 11 is limited to 
cases where the number of bits in a message 𝑀 is a multiple of 8 (ie. spans a whole 
number of bytes) and 𝑟 is a multiple of the lane size (as is the case for the SHA-3 
parameters [19]. In the pseudo-code 𝑆 denotes the state as an array of lanes with pad-
ded message 𝑃 organized as an array of blocks 𝑃𝑖  each of which is organized as an 
array of lanes themselves. 
Fig. 11: 𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘[𝑟, 𝑐] sponge function pseudo-code [22] 
Keccak[r,c](M): 
  //Initialization and padding 
  for (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ {{0, . . ,4}𝑥{0, . . ,4}}: 
    S[x,y] = 0 
  P = M || 0x01 || 0x00 || … || 0x00 
  P = P xor (0x00 || … || 0x00 || 0x80) 
 
  //Absorbing phase 
  for 𝑃𝑖 ∈ 𝑃: 
    for (𝑥, 𝑦) such that 𝑥 + 5 ∗ 𝑦 <
𝑟
𝑤
: 
      S[x,y] = S[x,y] xor 𝑃𝑖[𝑥 + 5𝑦] 
      S = Keccak-f[r+c](S) 
 
  //Squeezing phase 
  Z = empty string 
  while (output is requested): 
    for (𝑥, 𝑦) such that 𝑥 + 5 ∗ 𝑦 <
𝑟
𝑤
: 
      Z = Z || S[x,y] 
      S = Keccak-f[r+c](S) 
 
  Return Z 
 
  
4 Keyak 
Keyak [24] is a permutation-based authenticated encryption scheme supporting ses-
sions submitted to the 2nd round of the CAESAR competition. In this document when 
we mention Keyak we are referring to Keyak v2 unless explicitly stated otherwise. 
Keyak operates in the so-called Motorist mode (see section 4.2) and uses 𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘-𝑝 
(see section 4.3) as the underlying permutation and is free of inverses [29]. Keyak 
offers features such as in-place encryption, parallelizable encryption/decryption, in-
cremental AEAD [29] simultaneous processing of plaintext and associated data, ses-
sion support, intermediate authentication tags and the option to combine wrapping 
and unwrapping in the same session where upon unwrapping the plaintext is made 
available only if the tag is valid. Keyak consists of five named instances: River Keyak, 
Lake Keyak, Sea Keyak, Ocean Keyak and Lunar Keyak taking on specific parameter 
values as detailed in section 4.7. 
The material in this section draws upon that outlined in [20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28]. 
4.1 The Duplex Construction 
A duplex construction [20] is a construction closely related to the sponge construction 
with an equivalent level of security. The duplex construction allows for the alternation 
of input and output blocks (as shown in figure 12) at the same rate as the sponge con-
struction, analogous to full-duplex communication, which allows for efficient imple-
mentations of reseedable PRNGs and AE schemes requiring only one call to the per-
mutation function 𝑓 per input block. 
 
Fig. 12: Duplex construction [20] 
 
  
The duplex construction, like the sponge construction, starts by padding the input 
string to a length that is a multiple of 𝑟 using a reversible padding rule before cutting 
it into 𝑛  blocks of 𝑟  bits. Next 𝑏  bits of state 𝑆  are initialized to zero. Unlike the 
sponge construction, which is stateless in between calls, the duplex construction re-
sults in an object which accepts calls taking an input string and returning an output 
string which depends on all input received so far. Such an object, called a duplex 
object, is denoted as 𝐷. 
A duplex object 𝐷 has a 𝑏-bit internal state 𝑆 which is set to zero upon initialization. 
From then one can make calls to 𝐷. 𝑑𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝜎, 𝑙) (where 𝜎 denotes an input string 
and 𝑙 denotes the requested number of bits) where the maximum number of bits one 
can request is the bitrate 𝑟 and the input string 𝜎 has to be short enough such that after 
padding it results in a single 𝑟-bit block. This maximum length of 𝜎 is called the max-
imum duplex rate and denoted as 𝜌𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑝𝑎𝑑, 𝑟) and is always smaller than the bitrate 
𝑟. 
Executing a 𝐷. 𝑑𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝜎, 𝑙) call will have the duplex object pad the input string 𝜎 
and XOR it to the first 𝑟 bits of the internal state 𝑆 after which it applies permutation 
function 𝑓 to the state and returns the first 𝑙 bits of the state as output. Calls where 𝜎 
is the empty string are referred to as blank calls while calls with 𝑙 = 0 are referred to 
as mute calls. 
An example duplex construction API would look as follows: 
 Initialization: 𝐷 = 𝐷𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥[𝑓, 𝑝𝑎𝑑, 𝑟] 
 Duplexing calls: 𝐷. 𝑑𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝜎, 𝑙) 
4.2 Keyed Sponge Constructions 
Keyed sponge constructions can be divided in two categories: 
 Outer-keyed Sponge constructions: Bertoni et al. [26] introduced the keyed 
Sponge construction as an evaluation of the Sponge function over a concate-
nation of the key and the message, ie. 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑒(𝐾||𝑀). This type of keyed 
Sponge is denoted as outer-keyed. 
 
 Inner-keyed Sponge constructions: Chan et al. [27] introduced the inner-
keyed Sponge construction which takes the regular sponge construction and 
uses 𝐸𝐾
𝑓
 as the Sponge permutation. Here 𝑓 is a permutation, 𝐾 the key and 
𝐸𝐾
𝑓
 the Even-Mansour construction [28] which builds a 𝑏-bit block cipher 
from 𝑏-bit permutation using a 𝑏-bit key: 𝐸𝐾
𝑓 = 𝑓(𝑥 ⊕ 𝐾) ⊕ 𝐾. 
  
4.3 Full-State Keyed and Duplex Sponge Constructions 
In order to optimize the efficiency in Sponge-based authenticated encryption Mennink 
et al. [25] formalized the Full-State Duplex Sponge (FDS) construction which differs 
from the original duplex construction (see section 4.1) in that the key is explicitly 
used to initialize the state (making it a keyed construction) and the absorption phase is 
performed on the entire state which enforces explicit usage of the key. Mennink et al. 
[25] proved the increase in input block length from bitrate 𝑟 to full-state permutation 
width 𝑏 has no noticeable impact on the security of the generic construction while 
allowing for the injection of more bits per call to the underlying permutation and thus 
improving performance. 
Note that in full-state keyed sponge constructions the usage of outer-keyed sponge 
constructions makes no longer any security difference from the usage of inner-keyed 
sponge constructions and both can be seen as special cases of the Full-State Keyed 
Sponge (FKS) construction. 
4.3.1 Full-State Keyed Sponge Constructions 
The Full-State Keyed Sponge (FKS) constructions works by initializing the inner 𝑘 
bits of the state 𝑆 to the key 𝐾 (where 𝑘 ≤ 𝑐) and the outer (𝑏 − 𝑘) bits to zero. The 
message 𝑀 is padded to a bit-length that is a multiple of 𝑏 and absorbed in the usual 
sponge fashion. After absorption the squeezing phase outputs the outer 𝑟 bits of state 
𝑆 in the usual sponge fashion until the request amount of 𝑧 bits is output as illustrated 
in figure 13.  
 
Fig. 13: Full-State Keyed Sponge (FKS) construction [25] 
 
  
4.3.2 Full-State Duplex Constructions 
The Full-State Duplex Sponge (FDS) constructions works by initializing the inner 𝑘 
bits of the state 𝑆 to the key 𝐾 (where 𝑘 ≤ 𝑐) and the outer (𝑏 − 𝑘) bits either zero (as 
per figure 14a). In the Full-State Keyed Duplex (FSKD) construction outlined in [24] 
and shown in figure 14b initialization consists of setting the inner 𝑘 bits of state 𝑆 to 
key 𝐾 and the outer (𝑏 − 𝑘) bits to string 𝜎0 followed by application of the permuta-
tion 𝑓. Essentialy initialization of the latter is identical to initialization of the former 
followed by a single duplexing call with (unpadded) 𝑀1 = 𝜎0. This results in duplex 
object 𝐷 . Subsequent duplexing calls to 𝐷  can consume messages of up to 𝑏  bits 
while outputting string 𝑍 as illustrated in figures 14a and 14b. Both constructions are 
identical save for the slight difference in initialization. 
 
Fig. 14a: Full-State Duplex Sponge (FDS) construction as per [25] 
 
Fig. 14b: Full-State Keyed Duplex (FSKD) construction as per [24] 
The operation of the Motorist mode can be expressed in calls to FSKD objects. 
  
4.4 The Motorist mode 
The Motorist mode is a construction supporting authenticated encryption of sequences 
of messages in sessions and serves as a replacement for 𝐷𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑊𝑟𝑎𝑝  and 
𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑎𝑘𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 used in Keyak v1. In a given session it processes messages and ‘crypto-
grams’ where a message consists of a plaintext and possible associated data (which 
will be referred to as metadata from here on) and a cryptogram consists of a cipher-
text, possible metadata and an authentication tag. Messages can consist of metadata 
alone and the corresponding cryptogram will not have any ciphertext. 
 Wrapping: Each message is wrapped into a cryptogram by encrypting it into 
a ciphertext and computing an authentication tag over the full sequence of 
messages. 
 
 Unwrapping: Each cryptograph is unwrapped by decrypting the ciphertext 
into plaintext, verifying the authentication tag and returning the plaintext if 
the tag is valid. 
Within a session the tag of a given cryptogram authenticates the full sequence of mes-
sages sent/received since the start of that particular session. Starting a session requires 
a secret key (and possibly a nonce if the secret key is not unique for this session). 
4.4.1 Motorist’s Duplex Instances 
The Motorist mode is sponge-based and supports one or more duplex instances, in the 
form of so-called Pistons (see section 4.4.3.1) operating in parallel. It calls the du-
plexing function with input containing the key, nonce, plaintext and metadata bits and 
uses the output as tag or key stream bits. 
The Motorist duplex instances differ from the original duplex construction (see sec-
tion 4.1) in that they are full-state keyed duplex (FSKD) instances (see section 4.3.2) 
and accept input blocks as large (after padding) as the permutation width instead of 
only the bitrate width. The Motorist mode supports a parameterized degree of paral-
lelism in the form of an array of so-called Pistons (see section 4.4.3.1) each of which 
is an FSKD object. 
Motorist distributes the message (consisting of plaintext and metadata) over a set of 
different Piston duplex instances. In order to produce an authentication tag that de-
pends on the full message and not only on the message bits supplied to a single du-
plex instance, Motorist performs dedicated processing (called a knot) at the end of 
each message which extracts chaining values from each duplex instance and after 
concatenating them injects them into all duplex instances resulting in the state of all 
  
instances depend on the full sequence of messages. Finally it extracts an authentica-
tion tag from a single duplex object which authenticates the full message sequence 
(ie. session). 
4.4.2 Motorist’s Session Support 
In order to start a session Motorist consumes a globally unique and secret string called 
the Secret and Unique Value (SUV) consisting of a key and a nonce (with the recom-
mended order being the key coming first) which is injected into each duplex instance 
followed by the appending of a diversification string to diversify their states. A single 
Motorist session is sufficient for secure two-way communication but one must clearly 
indicate for every message who is the sender which can be done by including the 
sender’s identifier in the message metadata. An alternative approach would be relying 
on a strict alternating convention. The SUV nonce requirement is not required for 
Motorist sessions which perform unwrapping functionality only. 
4.4.3 Motorist’s Layers 
Motorist is specified in three layers each of which handle a different aspect of its 
functionality each consuming input in terms of byte streams (that is, strings of bytes 
that can be read from and written to in sequential fashion) where a sequence of con-
secutive bytes from a stream is called a fragment. 
4.4.3.1 Piston Layer 
The Piston layer is effectively an augmented full-state keyed duplex (FSKD) con-
struction that maintains a 𝑏-bit state 𝑆 and applies permutation 𝑓 to it and has further 
parameters squeezing rate 𝑅𝑠 and absorbing rate 𝑅𝑎 where 𝑅𝑠 ≤ 𝑅𝑎. It handles basic 
functionality such as data injection, simultaneous encryption or decryption (if so de-
sired), tag extraction and setting fragment offsets. The Piston state 𝑆 is initialized to 
zero and 𝑠[𝑖] denotes byte 𝑖 of state 𝑆.  
An example Piston API would look as follows: 
𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛[𝑓, 𝑅𝑠, 𝑅𝑎] 
Where 𝑓 denotes the underlying permutation function, 𝑅𝑠 the squeeze rate and 𝑅𝑎 the 
absorbing rate. 
When properly used, ie. through an Engine (see section 4.4.3.2), the Piston constructs 
a full-width input block from supplied plaintext, metadata and fragment offsets en-
coding as illustrated in figures 15a and 15b where either: 
  
 The block starts with a possible number of leading zeros (starting at index 0), 
followed by a plaintext fragment ending at index 𝑅𝑠, followed by a metadata 
fragment ending at index 𝑅𝑎, followed by the fragment offsets. 
 
 In the absence of plaintext metadata starts at index 0 and runs up to index 
𝑅𝑎. 
 
Fig. 15a,b: Piston full-width input blocks with (a) and without (b) plaintext 
Piston input blocks have four fragment offsets: 
 EOM: The EOM fragment offset functions both to denote the number of 
bytes in the next output block to be used as tag and to delimit messages by 
having a non-zero value if it is part of an input block that is the last of a mes-
sage or a string injected collectively. In case no tag is requested at the end of 
such a collectively injected message or string it takes the value 255 (0xFF). 
 
 Crypt End: The Crypt End fragment offset functions to denote the end of the 
plaintext fragment within the current input block. The start of this plaintext 
fragment is denoted by the EOM fragment offset of the previous input block 
where a value of 255 (0xFF) means the plaintext fragment starts at index 0. 
 
  
 Inject Start: The Inject Start fragment offset functions to denote the start of 
the metadata fragment within the current input block. If there is also a 
plaintext fragment within the current input block then the metadata fragment 
starts at 𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 = 𝑅𝑠 else it starts at 𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 = 0. 
 
 Inject End: The Inject End fragment offset functions to denote the end of the 
metadata fragment within the current input block. 
 
After the input block has been absorbed into the state and permutation function 𝑓 has 
been applied the outer part of the state is used as follows: 
 An arbitrary number of bytes used as tag, starting at index 0 
 
 An arbitrary number of bytes used as keystream, starting after the possible 
tag 
The Piston has four functions (replacing the traditional single Duplexing function of a 
Duplex object), illustrated in figures 16a-d, achieving the above functionality: 
 𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛. 𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡(𝐼, 𝑂, 𝜔, 𝑢𝑛𝑤𝑟𝑎𝑝𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔): This function, as illustrated in figure 
16a, supports the combined encryption of plaintext (or decryption of cipher-
text) and absorbing of the corresponding ciphertext (or plaintext) into the 
outer part of the state as long as input is available followed by updating the 
end of the plaintext fragment in the appropriate fragment offset. The parame-
ters are as follows: 
 
o 𝐼: Input bytestream (either plaintext or ciphertext) 
o 𝑂: Output bytestream where result will be written to 
o 𝜔: Index in the state from where the plaintext fragment must be in-
jected. The fragment will end at index 𝑅𝑠 or earlier (if input is ex-
hausted). The end of the plaintext fragment is set in offset 
𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝑑. 
o 𝑢𝑛𝑤𝑟𝑎𝑝𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔: Indicates whether we are encrypting (False) or de-
crypting (True) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Fig. 16a: 𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛. 𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡() pseudo-code [24] 
 𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛. 𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑋, 𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔): This function, illustrated in figure 16b, 
injects metadata taken from input bytestream 𝑋  starting from index 𝑅𝑠  if 
𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔 is set (indicating whether the current input block already has 
a plaintext fragment) or from index 0 if it is not. The metadata fragment will 
end at index 𝑅𝑎 or earlier (if input is exhausted). The start of the metadata 
fragment is set in offset 𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 16b: 𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛. 𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡() pseudo-code [24] 
 𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛. 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑘(𝑒𝑜𝑚𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔, 𝑙): This function, as illustrated in figure 16c, ap-
plies the underlying permutation 𝑓 to the state 𝑆. Before doing so it sets in 
the 𝐸𝑂𝑀 fragment offset whether this is the last input block of a message (or 
of a string collectively injected) as indicated by 𝑒𝑜𝑚𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔. If this is the case 
𝐸𝑂𝑀 is set to the number 𝑙 of bytes of the state 𝑆 (after application of 𝑓) 
which are reserved as tag. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 16c: 𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛. 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑘() pseudo-code [24] 
Crypt(I, O, 𝜔, unwrapFlag): 
  while (hasMore(I) and (𝜔 < 𝑅𝑠)) 
  { 
    x = I.get() 
    O.put(state[𝜔] ^ x) 
    state[𝜔] = x if (unwrapFlag) else (state[𝜔] ^ x) 
    𝜔++ 
  } 
  state[cryptEnd] ^= 𝜔 
  Return 
 
Inject(X, cryptingFlag): 
  𝜔 = 𝑅𝑠 if (cryptingFlag) else 0 
  state[injectStart] ^= 𝜔 
  while (hasMore(X) and (𝜔 < 𝑅𝑎)) 
  { 
    state[𝜔] ^= X.get() 
    𝜔++ 
  } 
  state[injectEnd] ^= 𝜔 
  Return 
 
Spark(eomFlag, l): 
  if (eomFlag): 
    state[EOM] ^= 255 if (l=0) else l 
  else 
    state[EOM] ^= 0 
  state = 𝑓(state) 
  Return 
 
  
 𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛. 𝐺𝑒𝑡𝑇𝑎𝑔(𝑇, 𝑙): This function writes the first 𝑙 bytes of the state 𝑆 to 
output byte stream 𝑇 to be used as a tag or chaining value. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 16d: 𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛. 𝐺𝑒𝑡𝑇𝑎𝑔() pseudo-code [24] 
4.4.3.2 Engine Layer 
The Engine layer controls and relies on an array of Π Piston objects operating in par-
allel. For every Piston the Engine maintains an attribute 𝐸𝑡 denoting how much output 
was used as tag or chaining value in order to pass this to 𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛. 𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡() and avoid 
the reuse of the bits as key stream.  
An example Engine API would look as follows: 
𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒[Π, 𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑠] 
Where Π denotes the number of parallel Pistons and 𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑠 denotes an array of Π 
Piston objects. 
The Engine also maintains a state machine in the 𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 attribute in order to direct the 
function call sequence in order to maintain consistency. The 𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 indicates how the 
Π input blocks are being constructed in the Π Piston objects with the following phases 
being available: 
 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ: The input blocks are empty 
 
 𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑: The input blocks have a plaintext fragment and more plaintext is 
coming 
 
 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑂𝑓𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡 : The input blocks have a plaintext fragment and no more 
plaintext is coming 
 
 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑂𝑓𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒: The input blocks have their fragments ready and the mes-
sage has been fully injected 
The engine has five functions, illustrated in figures 17a-e, achieving the above func-
tionality: 
GetTag(T, l): 
  assert (𝑙 ≤ 𝑅𝑠) 
  T.put(state[i]) for 𝑖 ∈ {0, . . , 𝑙 − 1} 
  Return 
 
  
 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒. 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑘(𝑒𝑜𝑚𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔, 𝑙): This function centralizes application of per-
mutation 𝑓 and calls the 𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛. 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑘(𝑒𝑜𝑚𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔, 𝑙𝑖) function for each of 
the Π Pistons, where 𝑙𝑖 ∈ 𝑙 with 𝑙 being a vector. After sparking the Pistons 
the 𝐸𝑡 value is set to 𝑙. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 17a: 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒. 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑘() pseudo-code [24] 
 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒. 𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡(𝐼, 𝑂, 𝑢𝑛𝑤𝑟𝑎𝑝𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔): This function dispatches input 𝐼 to the 
Pistons but requires the Engine to be in the 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ phase. It subsequently 
calls 𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛. 𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡(𝐼, 𝑂, 𝐸𝑡[𝑖], 𝑢𝑛𝑤𝑟𝑎𝑝𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔) on all of them where 𝑖 is the 
Piston index. If 𝐼 has not been exhausted (ie. there is more input stream) then 
the phase is set to 𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑 else it is set to 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑂𝑓𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡.  
 
Note that each Piston takes a fragment of 𝐼 and so the Pistons process up to 
Π𝑅𝑠 bytes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 17b: 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒. 𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡() pseudo-code [24] 
 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒. 𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝐴): This function dispatches metadata 𝐴 to the Pistons (pro-
vided the phase is not 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑂𝑓𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 ) by calling 
𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛. 𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝐴, (𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 ∈ {𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑, 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑂𝑓𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡})) on each of them. If 
both input and metadata streams are exhausted the phase is set to 
𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑂𝑓𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒  and application of 𝑓  is delayed until a call to 
𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒. 𝐺𝑒𝑡𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑠()  is made. Otherwise 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒. 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑘(𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒, 0Π)  is 
called and the phase is reset to 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ. 
 
Note that each Piston takes a fragment of 𝐴 and so the Pistons process up to 
Π(𝑅𝑎 − 𝑅𝑠) bytes if 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒. 𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡() was called before and Π𝑅𝑎 bytes oth-
erwise. 
 
 
Spark(eomFlag, l): 
  Pistons[i].Spark(eomFlag, l[i]) for 𝑖 ∈ {0, . . , Π − 1} 
  𝐸𝑡 = 𝑙 
  Return 
 
Crypt(I, O, unwrapFlag): 
  assert (phase = fresh) 
  Pistons[i].Crypt(I, O, 𝐸𝑡[i], unwrapFlag) for 𝑖 ∈ {0, . . , Π − 1} 
  phase = crypted if (hasMore(I)) else endOfCrypt 
  Return 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 17c: 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒. 𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡() pseudo-code [24] 
 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒. 𝐺𝑒𝑡𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑠(𝑇, 𝑙): This function, which can only be called if the phase 
is 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑂𝑓𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 , calls 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒. 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑘(𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑙)  and collects the corre-
sponding tags in output stream 𝑇  from all Pistons by calling 
𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛. 𝐺𝑒𝑡𝑇𝑎𝑔(𝑇, 𝑙[𝑖]) on them where 𝑖 is the Piston index. It then sets the 
phase to 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ again. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 17d: 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒. 𝐺𝑒𝑡𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑠() pseudo-code [24] 
 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒. 𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒(𝑋, 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑦𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔):  This function, which can 
only be called if the phase is 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ, injects the same metadata 𝑋 to all Piston 
objects by calling 𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛. 𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑋𝑡[𝑖], 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒) on them and is used to inject 
the 𝑆𝑈𝑉 and chaining values. When 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑦𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔 is set (as set when in-
jecting the 𝑆𝑈𝑉) it appends to 𝑋 two bytes: 
 
o One byte encoding the degree of parallelism Π (for domain separa-
tion between instances with a different number of Piston objects) 
 
o One byte encoding the index of the Piston object (for domain sepa-
ration between Piston objects, in particular to avoid identical key-
streams) 
 
After the whole stream 𝑋 is processed the phase is set to 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑂𝑓𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒. 
 
 
Inject(A): 
  assert (phase ∈ {fresh, crypted, endOfCrypt}) 
  cryptingFlag = (phase ∈ {crypted, endOfCrypt}) 
 
  Pistons[i].Inject(A, cryptingFlag) for 𝑖 ∈ {0, . . , Π − 1} 
  if ((phase = crypted) or (hasMore(A))): 
  { 
    Spark(false, {0x00}Π) 
    phase = fresh 
  } 
  else: 
    phase = endOfMessage 
  Return 
 
GetTags(T, l): 
  assert (phase = endOfMessage) 
  Spark(true, l) 
  Pistons[i].GetTag(T, 𝑙[𝑖]) for 𝑖 ∈ {0, . . , Π − 1} 
  phase = fresh 
  Return 
 
  
Fig. 17e: 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒. 𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒() pseudo-code [24] 
4.4.3.3 Motorist Layer 
The Motorist layer controls an Engine object which controls a number Π of Piston 
objects. The Motorist layer has a parameter 𝑊  (typically 32 or 64) denoting the 
alignment unit which ensures fragment start offsets, tag lengths, chaining values and 
fragments (except upon stream exhaustion) are a multiple of 𝑊 allowing for multi-
byte chunk data manipulation. The Motorist layer finally also has parameters which 
determine security strength: capacity 𝑐 and tag length 𝜏. From the latter the following 
is determined: 
 𝑅𝑠: The squeezing rate is the largest multiple of 𝑊 such that at least 𝑐 bits 
(for the inner part) or 32 bits (for the fragment offsets) of the state are never 
used as output. 
 
 𝑅𝑎: The absorbing rate is the largest multiple of 𝑊 such that at least 32 bits 
at the end of the state are reserved for absorbing the fragment offsets. 
 
 𝑐′: The chaining value length is the smallest multiple of 𝑊 greater than or 
equal to capacity 𝑐. 
An example Motorist API would look as follows: 
𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡[𝑓, Π, 𝑊, 𝑐, 𝜏] 
The Motorist maintains a 𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 attribute with the following possible values: 
 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑦: The Motorist object has been initialized and no input has been given 
yet. 
InjectCollective(X, diversifyFlag): 
  assert (phase = fresh) 
  𝑋𝑡 = {𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚()}
Π   
   
  while(hasMore(X)) 
  { 
    x = X.get() 
    𝑋𝑡[𝑖]. 𝑝𝑢𝑡(x) 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝑖 ∈ {0, . . , Π − 1} 
  } 
 
  if(diversifyFlag): 
    (𝑋𝑡[𝑖]. 𝑝𝑢𝑡(Π); 𝑋𝑡[𝑖]. 𝑝𝑢𝑡(𝑖)) 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝑖 ∈ {0, . . , Π − 1}   
 
  𝑋𝑡[𝑖]. 𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑘(0,0) 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝑖 ∈ {0, . . , Π − 1} 
 
  while(hasMore(𝑋𝑡[0])) 
  { 
    Pistons[i].Inject(𝑋𝑡[𝑖], 0) for 𝑖 ∈ {0, . . , Π − 1} 
    if(hasMore(𝑋𝑡[0])): 
      Spark(False, {0x00}Π) 
  } 
  phase = endOfMessage 
  Return 
 
  
 
 𝑅𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔: The Motorist object processed the 𝑆𝑈𝑉 and can no wrap or unwrap. 
This remains the phase until an error occurs. 
 
 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑: The Motorist object received an incorrect tag. 
The motorist has four functions, illustrated in figures 18a-d, achieving the above func-
tionality: 
 𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡. 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒(𝑆𝑈𝑉, 𝑡𝑎𝑔𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔, 𝑇, 𝑢𝑛𝑤𝑟𝑎𝑝𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔, 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔):  
This function, which can only be called if the phase is 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑦, starts a ses-
sion with a given 𝑆𝑈𝑉 read from the 𝑆𝑈𝑉 byte stream. It is collectively in-
jected with the 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑦𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔  set for domain separation by calling 
𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒. 𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒(𝑆𝑈𝑉, 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒). If the parameter 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔 is set 
a knot is needed and 𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡. 𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑡()  is called after which 
𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡. 𝐻𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑇𝑎𝑔(𝑡𝑎𝑔𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔, 𝑇, 𝑢𝑛𝑤𝑟𝑎𝑝𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔) is called. This last step 
supports generation of verification of a tag by means of 𝑡𝑎𝑔𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔 . If 
𝑢𝑛𝑤𝑟𝑎𝑝𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔 is set it verifies tag 𝑇 else it returns a tag in 𝑇. If this succeeds 
then the phase is set to 𝑅𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 18a: 𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡. 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒() pseudo-code [24] 
 𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡. 𝑊𝑟𝑎𝑝(𝐼, 𝑂, 𝐴, 𝑇, 𝑢𝑛𝑤𝑟𝑎𝑝𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔, 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔):  This function, 
which can only be called if the phase is 𝑅𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔, unwraps cryptograms or 
wraps messages (depending on if 𝑢𝑛𝑤𝑟𝑎𝑝𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔 is set or not, respectively). 
The function starts by processing input 𝐼 and metadata 𝐴. 
 
If there is no available input or metadata it sets the right Engine phase by 
calling 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒. 𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝐴) . As long as there is available input 𝐼  it calls 
𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒. 𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡(𝐼, 𝑂, 𝑢𝑛𝑤𝑟𝑎𝑝𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔), where 𝑂 denotes the output stream, fol-
StartEngine(SUV, tagFlag, T, unwrapFlag, forgetFlag): 
  assert (phase = ready) 
  Engine.InjectCollective(SUV, true) 
   
  if (forgetFlag): 
    MakeKnot() 
   
  r = HandleTag(tagFlag, T, unwrapFlag) 
  if (r): 
    phase = riding 
 
  Return r 
 
  
lowed by a call 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒. 𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝐴) until there is no more available input. 
Next, as long as there is available metadata 𝐴 it calls 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒. 𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝐴) un-
til there is no more available metadata. If either Π > 1 or 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔 is set 
a call to 𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡. 𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑡()  is made. Finally a call to 
𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡. 𝐻𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑇𝑎𝑔(𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑇, 𝑢𝑛𝑤𝑟𝑎𝑝𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔) is made and only if it suc-
ceeds does the 𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡. 𝑊𝑟𝑎𝑝 call succeed and produce output in output 
stream 𝑂. A failing call to 𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡. 𝐻𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑇𝑎𝑔 results in a cleared output 
stream 𝑂. 
 
This function can be called to either wrap or unwrap which is done as fol-
lows: 
o 𝑊𝑟𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔 : The function is to be called with 𝑢𝑛𝑤𝑟𝑎𝑝𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔 =
𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒, a plaintext input stream 𝐼 and metadata stream 𝐴, an output 
stream 𝑂 for receiving the ciphertext and tag stream 𝑇 for receiving 
the tag as well as 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔. 
 
o 𝑈𝑛𝑤𝑟𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔: The function is to be called with 𝑢𝑛𝑤𝑟𝑎𝑝𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔 =
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 , a ciphertext input stream 𝐼 , metadata stream 𝐴 , and tag 
stream 𝑇 and an output stream 𝑂 for receiving the plaintext as well 
as 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔. The function returns 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 iff the tag is correct and 
false otherwise. The function clears 𝑂 if the tag is incorrect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Fig. 18b: 𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡. 𝑊𝑟𝑎𝑝() pseudo-code [24] 
Wrap(I,O,A,T, unwrapFlag, forgetFlag): 
  assert (phase = riding) 
 
  Engine.Inject(A) if (hasMore(I) and not (hasMore(A))) 
   
  while(hasMore(I)): 
  { 
    Engine.Crypt(I, O, unwrapFlag) 
    Engine.Inject(A) 
  } 
 
  while(hasMore(A)): 
    Engine.Inject(A) 
 
  MakeKnot() if ((Π > 1) or (forgetFlag)) 
  r = HandleTag(true, T, unwrapFlag) 
  O.erase() if not(r) 
 
  Return r 
 
  
 𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡. 𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑡(): This function, which is only used internally by the 
Motorist, is used to either make a tag depend on the state of Π > 1 Pistons 
or, when Π = 1, achieve forgetting. The function starts by retrieving a 𝑐′-bit 
chaining values from every Piston object by calling 
𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒. 𝐺𝑒𝑡𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑠(𝑇′, [
𝑐′
8
]
Π
), where 𝑇′ is an initially empty local bytestream, 
and concatenates them into a Π𝑐′-bit string which is collectively injected into 
all Piston objects by calling 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒. 𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒(𝑇′, 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 18c: 𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡. 𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑡() pseudo-code [24] 
 𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡. 𝐻𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑇𝑎𝑔(𝑡𝑎𝑔𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔, 𝑇, 𝑢𝑛𝑤𝑟𝑎𝑝𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔): This function, which is 
only used internally by the Motorist, starts out with an initially empty byte 
stream 𝑇′  and if 𝑡𝑎𝑔𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔  is set proceeds to obtain tags using 
𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒. 𝐺𝑒𝑡𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑠(𝑇′, [
𝜏
8
, 0Π−1]) and followed by either copying 𝑇′ to 𝑇 (if 
𝑢𝑛𝑤𝑟𝑎𝑝𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔 = 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 ) to obtain a tag during wrapping or (if 
𝑢𝑛𝑤𝑟𝑎𝑝𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔 = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒) checking whether 𝑇′ ≠ 𝑇 and if so setting phase to 
𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑  in order to indicate that the resulting tag and desired tag did not 
match during unwrapping. If 𝑡𝑎𝑔𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔  is not set it simply calls 
𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒. 𝐺𝑒𝑡𝑇𝑎𝑔𝑠(𝑇′, 0Π) to move the engine phase along. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 18d: 𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡. 𝐻𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑇𝑎𝑔() pseudo-code [24] 
MakeKnot(): 
  T′ = byteStream() 
  Engine.GetTags(T′, {
c′
8
}Π) 
  T′. 𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑘(0,0) 
  Engine.InjectCollective(T′, false) 
  Return 
 
HandleTag(tagFlag, T, unwrapFlag): 
  T′ = byteStream() 
  if not(tagFlag): 
    Engine.GetTags(T′, {0𝑥00}Π) 
  else: 
    l = {0𝑥00}Π;  𝑙[0] =
𝜏
8
 
    Engine.GetTags(T′, l) 
         if not(unwrapFlag): (T = T′) 
    else if not(T′ = T): 
      phase = failed;  
      Return false 
  Return true 
 
  
After starting a session with 𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡. 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒() the Motorist object can re-
ceive an arbitrary number of calls to 𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡. 𝑊𝑟𝑎𝑝(). The nonce requirement of 
the 𝑆𝑈𝑉 holds at session level (within a session messages have no explicit number of 
nonce but must be processed in-order for tag verification). Both communicating par-
ties must use synchronized values for the 𝑡𝑎𝑔𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔 and 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔 parameters. 
4.5 The 𝑲𝒆𝒄𝒄𝒂𝒌𝒑 permutations 
The 𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘𝑝 permutations are derived from the 𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘𝑓 permutations (see section 
3.2) and have a tweakable number of rounds. A 𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘𝑝 permutation is defined as 
𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘𝑝[𝑏, 𝑛𝑟]  where 𝑏  is the permutation width (where 𝑏 = 25 ∗ 2
𝑙  and 0 ≤ 𝑙 ≤
6, 𝑙 ∈ ℤ) and 𝑛𝑟 the number of rounds. In short 𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘𝑝[𝑏, 𝑛𝑟] consists of the appli-
cation of the last 𝑛𝑟  rounds of 𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘𝑓[𝑏] . In the case that 𝑛𝑟 = 12 + 2𝑙  then 
𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘𝑝[𝑏, 𝑛𝑟] = 𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘𝑓[𝑏]. 
4.6 The Key Pack 
Keyak keys are encoded in so-called Key Packs which serve to encode secret keys as 
prefix of an 𝑆𝑈𝑉. Key packs make use of the pad10*[𝑟](|𝑀|) padding rule which 
returns a bitstring 10𝑞  where 𝑞 = (|𝑀| − 1) mod 𝑟. If 𝑟 is a multiple of 8 and 𝑀 a 
sequence of bytes the padding rule returns the bytestring 0𝑥01 0𝑥00
𝑞−7
8 . Given a key 
𝐾 a key pack of 𝑙 bytes is defined as: 
𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘(𝐾, 𝑙) = 𝑒𝑛𝑐8(𝑙)||𝐾||𝑝𝑎𝑑10*[𝑙 − 8](|𝐾|) 
Where 𝑙 < 256 indicates the full length of the key pack in bytes and key 𝐾 is limited 
to 8(𝑙 − 1) − 1 bits resulting in the key pack illustrated in figure 19. 
 
Fig. 19: 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘(𝐾, 18) with 64-bit key 𝐾. 
  
  
4.7 The Keyak Encryption Scheme 
Combining the above documented functionality gives us the Keyak encryption 
scheme as an instantiation of the Motorist mode with a 𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘𝑝 instance as permuta-
tion. A Keyak instance is defined as follows: 
𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑎𝑘[𝑏, 𝑛𝑟 , Π, 𝑐, 𝜏] = 𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡[𝐾𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑘𝑝[𝑏, 𝑛𝑟], Π, 𝑊, 𝑐, 𝜏] 
Where 𝑊 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (
𝑏
25
, 8). 
The SUV is given as: 
𝑆𝑈𝑉 = 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘(𝐾, 𝑙𝑘)||𝑁 
Where 𝑙𝑘 =
𝑊
8
⌈
𝑐+9
𝑊
⌉ and no limitation on the length of nonce 𝑁. 
4.7.1 Keyak Named Instances 
There are five named Keyak instances taking on various specific parameters and being 
suitable for various different optimizations. All instances have the following parame-
ters: 𝑛𝑟 = 12, 𝑐 = 256, 𝜏 = 128 (specifying the usage of 12 rounds, a capacity of 
256-bits and a tag size of 128-bits respectively). The instances are, in order of increas-
ing state size: 
 River Keyak: 𝑏 = 800, Π = 1 
 
 Lake Keyak: 𝑏 = 1600, Π = 1 (primary recommendation) 
 
 Sea Keyak: 𝑏 = 1600, Π = 2 
 
 Ocean Keyak: 𝑏 = 1600, Π = 4 
 
 Lunar Keyak: 𝑏 = 1600, Π = 8 
For River Keyak 𝑊 = 32 and key pack length 𝑙𝑘 = 36 𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠 while for the other in-
stances 𝑊 = 64, 𝑙𝑘 = 40 𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠. All instances take a (variable length) public message 
number or nonce 𝑁 but no private message number. If 𝑁 is to be fixed length it is 
proposed to be 58 bytes for River Keyak and 150 bytes for other instances. All in-
stances produce a 𝜏 = 128-bit tag (or MAC) which can be truncated if desired by the 
user. If not truncated the gap between plaintext and ciphertext length is 128 bits. Key 
sizes are variable with key size 128 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑙𝑘  (where the maximum is at least 256 
bits).  
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